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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has provided the world with wondrous benefits, 
allowing the free flow of information to anywhere in the world 
that has access to it, while contributing to the growth of the 
global economy by allowing the consumer to purchase items 
from all over the world. However, with these great benefits, the 
Internet does have a serious drawback, online privacy problems.
Limiting the privacy issues solely to the Internet is an incredibly 
narrow definition because the problem generally occurs with the 
uncontrolled proliferation of information,2 but for the purpose of 
this note, privacy issues are strictly limited to online.
Uncontrolled proliferation has occurred numerous times in 
Western history with the invention of the printing press, radio, 
and television just to name a few. With these proliferation issues, 
government typically steps in to protect its citizens/subjects and 
itself. This is true of the European Union and its privacy policy. 
In 1995, the European Union instituted the EU Data 
Protection Directive (Privacy Directive), requiring complete 
member compliance by 1998.3 Generally, the Privacy Directive 
prevents the transmission of personal data to non-EU member 
countries without adequate protection levels of personal 
information.4 The standard imposed by, and noncompliance 
with, the Privacy Directive threatened to disrupt and possibly 
prevent United States businesses from operating in the European 
Member countries, potentially igniting a trade war between two 
2. See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy 
Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and 
Surveillance Law and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
1, 4 (1999-2000).
3. Id. at 12; Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy be Regulation 
Effectively on a National Level - Thoughts on the Possible Need for 
International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV. 129, 156 (1996). Integration and 
adoption was substantially slow. By October 1999, “only six of the fifteen 
Member States had fully implemented [the Privacy Directive].” Andrew 
Charlesworth, Clash of the Data Titans? US and EU Data Privacy Regulation,
6 EUR. PUB. L. 253, 258 (2000).
4. Gellman, supra note 3, at 157.
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global powers.5 However, this threat was alleviated with the 
negotiation of the Safe Harbor Agreement between the United 
States Department of Commerce and the European 
Commission.6 While the Safe Harbor Agreement continued the 
trade between EU member countries and U.S. businesses, the 
Safe Harbor Agreement is just a bandage, and the Privacy 
Directive will spark change in the United States and other
countries’ privacy protection to provide protections similar to the 
conditions in the Privacy Directive.
Americans do not give a second thought when they purchase 
something from eBay, Amazon, bestbuy.com (the list goes on).
Americans pay and receive the product, but what happens to the 
information they give the companies, such as their name, 
shipping address, billing address, etc? When people make online 
purchases or increase their digital presence through social 
networks, like Facebook, Twitter, or creating a Google account, 
they voluntarily give the companies personal information, and 
companies use this information for the companies’ benefit.
Europeans, on the other hand, will question the necessity of 
obtaining the same information because privacy protection has 
developed as a part of the European culture.7
However, the businesses are not limited to acquiring 
information from people voluntarily through purchases and 
services. The advancements in technology have made collecting, 
5. See id. at 158; Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S.
Multinational Employers: Navigating Through the “Safe Harbor” Principles
to Comply with the EU Data Privacy Directive, 7 AM. BUS. L.J. 735, 738-39
(2001).
6. Lauren B. Movius & Nathalie Krup, U.S. and EU Privacy
Policy: Comparison of Regulatory Approaches, 3 INT’L J. COMM. 167, 173
(2009).
7. See George et al., supra note 5, at 744-45; Eric Dash, Europe
Zips Lips; U.S. Sells ZIPs, N.Y. TIMES, (August 7, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/07/weekinreview/07dash.html?pagewanted
=print&_r=0; Fred Norman, Example: US versus EU Internet Privacy
Policy, UNIV. OF TEX., http://www.laits.utexas.edu/~anorman/61N/Text
/Information%20Policy/US-Eu.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
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storing, and processing information easier and cheaper.8 To 
utilize customers’ tendencies on the Internet, businesses also use 
cookies.9 These cookies can be placed in the computer by just 
visiting a website.10 Once programmed in the computer, the 
cookies allow businesses to track the user’s web surfing and 
collect personal information from the user.11 Cookies are very 
different from voluntary information because the cookies only 
track users’ online behavior and do not collect information such 
as names, addresses, etc.12 The companies retain and process the 
information to a usable format and sometimes sell the 
information to other businesses or collection companies that 
amass a large database to sell to interested companies; 
transactions that total in the billions, potentially trillions
annually.13 Typically, businesses will use this collected 
information to target customers to purchase specific products,14
which might go through the SPAM filter. The information can be 
used to give a recommendation of similar products on the home 
page.15 For example, the Google method uses targeted 
8. Testimony on Online Privacy Concerns of 2001: Before the
Subcomm. on Commc’n, Trade and Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. (2001) 
(statement of Paul H. Rubin, Professor of Law and Economics, Emory 
University) [hereinafter Privacy Concerns].
9. Rebecca Lynch, What’s All the Fuss About?, CIO MAGAZINE




13. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protections: The
Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy
Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 18 (2000).
14. See Angela Vitale, The EU Privacy Directive and the Resulting 
Safe Harbor: The Negative Effects on U.S. Legislation Concerning Privacy on 
the Internet, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 325 (2000); Privacy Concerns, 
supra note 8.
15. Amanda C. Border, Untangling the Web: An Argument for 
Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363 (2012); U.S. Firms Get Privacy Lessons from Europe,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (July 1, 2010) [hereinafter Privacy Lessons from 
Europe], available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/
jul2010/gb2010071_033299.htm.
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advertisements based on the content of your emails and content 
from other Google services.16 Regardless, how the businesses
use the personal information, it is typically for the company’s
economic benefit.
Although Americans may find the SPAM annoying, many 
Americans likely do not care and ignore the emails, but the 
information sharing that makes SPAM possible also provides 
benefits to the consumer, such as lower prices for products 
because the companies do not spend as much money for 
advertising by targeting the customers.17 However, the same 
cannot be said about the citizens of the European Union Member 
States. The Privacy Directive established that EU citizens have 
more control over their individual information processed by 
businesses. Under the Privacy Directive, businesses can operate 
similar to how they do in the United States, but the businesses 
have to “jump through some hoops,” which I will discuss later.18
This does not mean that the United States is completely deficient 
in privacy protection. In fact, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
privacy protection in the Bill of Rights, notably the Fourth 
Amendment, and supplemented by acts of Congress and state 
legislation.19
16. Chris Crum, Europe Isn’t Satisfied with Google’s Privacy Policy.
Are You?, WEBPRONEWS, (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/
europe-isnt-satisfied-with-googles-privacy-policy-are-you-2012-10; Privacy 
Lessons from Europe, supra note 15; Sunni Yuen, Exporting Truth With
Data: Audited Self-Regulation as a Solution to Cross-Border Data Transfer 
Protection Concerns in the Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 41, 44 (2008).
17. See generally Vitale, supra note 14, at 325-26; Marc Brailor, AeA 
Unveils Federal Privacy Principles; Says Balanced Approach, Uniform 
Standards, Can Build Consumer Confidence, Boost Internet Growth,
AEANET.ORG, (Jan. 18, 2001), http:www.aeanet.org/pressroom/prêt-
privacyprinciples011801.asp; Matthew S. Kirsch, Do-Not-Track: Revising the 
EU’s Data Protection Framework to Require Meaningful Content for 
Behavioral Adverting, 18 RICH. J. L. TECH. 1, 1-3 (2011-2012).
18. See discussion infra sec. II pts (B)-(C).
19. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 2, at 18; Charlesworth, supra
note 3, at 259.
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This note will consider numerous issues involving the Privacy 
Directive. Part II will examine the details and impact of 
compliance with the Privacy Directive as well as how the United 
States has complied and conflicted with the Directive, including 
compliance through the Safe Harbor Agreement. Part II will also 
consider the different approach to privacy protection between the 
U.S. and EU and how the different cultures developed the 
different approaches. Part III will explain the changes in privacy 
protection in the proposed EU Data Regulation, including the 
potential costs and benefits from proposed changes, while 
analyzing the potential effects of the EU Data Regulation on the 
Safe Harbor Agreement. Part III will conclude the Data 
Regulation will have relatively little effect on the Safe Harbor 
Agreement. Part IV will weigh the market effect of the European 
Union and the conflict of laws between the U.S. and EU. Finally, 
this note will consider and conclude the Privacy Directive, Data 
Regulation, and U.S. compliance are steps towards creating an 
international privacy regulation.
II. UNITED STATES VERSUS THE EUROPEAN UNION
Privacy means different things to people in different contexts 
and situations and to pinpoint one definition is difficult, if not 
impossible.20 For the purpose of this note, privacy is the ability 
to control one’s personal information. In addition, for the 
purpose of this note privacy protection does not mean prevention 
of hacking and identity theft, but rather the methods used to give 
people dominion over their personal information. Privacy 
protection does, however, have positive correlations to limit 
hacking and identity theft because the businesses provide more 
advanced data security.21 To provide the necessary privacy 
20. Lawrence Jenab, Will the Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of
Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th Congress, 49
U. KAN. L. REV. 641, 647 (2001).
21. See generally Person Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S.
1789, 109th Cong. (2005) (concerning increased privacy protection to assist
victims and potential victims of identity theft).
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protections in the Age of Information, governments have taken 
different approaches, but the most notable are the ones taken by 
the US and the EU.
A. The United States Approach to Privacy Protection
While some countries and states consider privacy explicitly in 
their constitutions, the United States Supreme Court has only 
found privacy implicitly in the Bill of Rights.22 However, the 
protection implied by the Court has only been held against the 
government and only when a citizen had a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”23 This limitation against the government 
stemmed from a historic fear of government collection and use 
of information against the people.24 Similar to the European 
Union’s progressive privacy protection with the advances in 
technology, the Court has also advanced protections with new 
technology. Most notably in Katz v. United States, the Court held 
the use of an electronic listening device within a phone booth 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”25 Over 30 years later, the 
Court, in Kyllo v. United States, held that using a thermal imager 
was a search and violated the Fourth Amendment.26 Even if 
these privacy protections did not only apply to the federal and 
state governments, once the person voluntarily discloses 
information to any company, there is no “expectation of 
22. Banisar & Davies, supra note 2, at 108.
23. Id.
24. See Dash, supra note 7.
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (J. Harlan, 
concurring). The Court incorporated and continues to incorporate the language 
in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in cases involving Fourth Amendment 
searches. See generally United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); see also
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013).
26. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (The Court
focused on the theory that the thermal imager gave the user “intimate
details” of the home. Id. The home has typically received higher protection
in privacy jurisprudence. Id. at 37).
1102 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
privacy[,]”unless the privacy policy explicitly provides 
protection to the data subject.27
There are civil protections for privacy, but the protections are 
generally limited to the “right to be let alone”28 established 
through common law privacy torts.29 Sometimes, a website has 
privacy policies and a potential breach of contract claim if the 
business transfers the personal information to a third party.30
There is also a potential intellectual property claim. Scholars also 
argue that personal information should be treated as an 
intellectual property right31 because the right creates private 
control over public commercial information.32 However, this 
view creates a First Amendment issue. Courts have generally 
held the information as protected commercial free speech 
allowing the businesses to transfer the information.33 Under the 
United States’ approach, the courts attempt to balance the 
individual’s desire to maintain his personal information and 
society’s use of the information.34
27. Marie Clear, Falling Into the Gap: The European Union’s Data
Protection Act and Its Impact on U.S Law and Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 981, 995 (2000).
28. Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 259.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977). The
common law privacy torts includes (1) unreasonable intrusion on the privacy
of another; (2) use of another’s name or likeness; and (3) unreasonable
publicizing another’s private life. Id.
30. See Lauren B. Cardonsky, Towards a Meaningful Right to
Privacy in the United Kingdom, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 393, 396 (2002); George 
et al., supra note 5, at 780.
31. Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm
Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2042 (2000).
32. Rochell Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding
(More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 8, ¶ 4 (1999).
33. See id. ¶ 25. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Compco Corp. v. Day Bright Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964)).
34. David A. Castor, Treading Water in the Data Privacy Age: An 
Analysis of Safe Harbor’s First Year, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 271 
(2001-2002); see also Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the
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In addition to constitutional and common law applications, 
Congress has provided a patchwork of statutes to give privacy 
protection, but the statutes are limited to specific industries and 
sectors listed by statute. The examples of Congressional 
statutory protections include the Fair Credit Reporting Act,35
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,36 Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act,37 and the Privacy Act of 1974,38 to name a 
few. The industries and sectors that are not regulated by statute 
are encouraged by the government to self-regulate the private 
data they receive.39 The self-regulation method allows the 
industries to develop standards without government intervention. 
This laissez-faire, “hands off” approach by the government is a 
historical approach traditionally taken by the federal 
government.40 There is still government oversight of the self-
regulatory approach through the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), but the FTC only has limited power to enforce what the 
companies have adopted, instead of requiring the companies to 
adopt policies.41 The self-regulatory approach still continues 
even under the Privacy Directive.42
Internet: Has the Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1183, 1197 (1999).
35. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994 & Supp.
1998) (regulating crediting reporting agencies and employment related data).
36. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-012, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (regulating data processing practices 
of financial institutions).
37. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 100 Stat. 1936 (1996) (regulating data collected by health care 
institutions).
38. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). While the government is 
limited in how information is collected, the Privacy Act of 1974 governs the 
government’s use and dissemination of personal information. Border, supra
note 15, at 366. 
39. Cody, supra note 34, at 1203.
40. Id.
41. Laura Ybarra, The E.U. Model as an Adoptable Approach for U.S. 
Privacy Laws: A Comparative Analysis of Data Collection Laws in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 267, 272 (2011). Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, 
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One piece of legislation passed in 2001 still has a 
considerable impact on privacy in the United States and privacy 
interests abroad: the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act).43 Under 
the Patriot Act, the federal government has more power to obtain 
information.44 The act does not prevent businesses from 
obtaining information from consumers like the Privacy 
Directive. However, the Patriot Act allows the federal 
government to obtain access to businesses’ data records to track 
potential terrorists.45 The Patriot Act has caused concern under 
the Privacy Directive and is an issue that the note will address 
later.46
B. The European Union’s approach
In Europe, privacy is a fundamental human right.47 In 1995, 
the European Council of Ministers enacted the EU Data 
Protection Directive.48 To understand how the Privacy Directive 
applies, it is fundamental to understand the composition and 
function of the European Union. First, there are three major 
branches: the European Commission, which recommends policy; 
the European Council of Ministers, which passes the policies; 
and the European Court of Justice, which hears violations of, 
interprets, and applies the European Union’s law.49 Think of the 
European Union government as similar to the United States 
and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2008).
42. See discussion infra Sec. II.C.
43. See generally USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 
28, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
44. See generally id.
45. See generally id.
46. See discussion, infra Sec IV.B.
47. Fred H. Crate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information 
Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431, 432-33 (1994-95), 
available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1647&context=facpub.
48. Id. at 432-33.
49. Clear, supra note 27, at 982.
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government; there are three branches and they all pass 
preempting laws affecting its members, who also have sovereign 
authority.50 However, the European Union also contains 
numerous associations, commissions, committees, and councils 
in addition to the three bodies named above.51
When the European Union adopted the Privacy Directive, it 
intended the directive to create uniform rules and privacy 
standards among the member countries.52 Before the Privacy 
Directive, the member countries’ privacy standards were 
scattered. The European Union used the Privacy Directive to 
further the European Union’s purpose, which was to create and 
maintain a unified market and free flow of information among 
the member states, which is self-evident from the language of the 
Privacy Directive.53
The Privacy Directive begins by acknowledging that privacy 
protection is a fundamental human right with the purpose of 
allowing the free flow of information between Member States.54
Under Article 3, the Privacy Directive identifies the scope as 
“the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means 
of personal data which form part of a filing system or are 
intended to form part of a filing system.”55 However, the Privacy 
Directive excludes from the scope any “processing operations 
concerning public security, defen[s]e, [national] security. . . and 
50. Currently, the European Union has 27 countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherland, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. However, only 15 of the 27 were member states at the time of 
adopting the Privacy Directive. See Countries, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
51. Clear, supra note 27, at 982.
52. See id.
53. Dash, supra note 7; Shaffer, supra note 13, at 10-11.
54. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 1(1), 
1990 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 [hereinafter Privacy Directive].
55. Id. art. 3(1).
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the activities of the State in areas of criminal law” and “by a 
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity.”56 Article 2 defines personal data as “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’);57 . . . by reference to an identification number or to one 
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity.”58 Also, Article 2 defines 
processing as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”59
When the Article 2 definitions are combined with the scope from 
Article 3, the Privacy Directive creates a broad scope for 
enforcement for an inclusive range of interpretation and for the 
Privacy Directive to have a continued effect with advances in 
technology beyond the European Union’s initial vision.60
Furthermore, Article 4 addresses the structure and process to 
obtain information from the “data subject.” Article 4 places 
minimum requirements on businesses. First, the businesses will 
56. Id. art. 3(2).
57. A data subject is an identified or identifiable natural person. Id.
art. 2(a). “Natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity” is a narrow exception to the scope of the Privacy Directive. Id. art. 
3(2). This exception likely exists because 1) it is difficult to enforce against
an individual person, 2) there is no threat of mass proliferation for profit
from individuals using the information for personal reasons, 3) it provides a
balance between compelling individual interests and the free flow of
information.
58. A data subject is an identified or identifiable natural person. Id.
art. 2(a). “Natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity” is a narrow exception to the scope of the Privacy Directive. Id. art. 
3(2). This exception likely exists because 1) it is difficult to enforce against
an individual person, 2) there is no threat of mass proliferation for profit
from individuals using the information for personal reasons, 3) it provides a
balance between compelling individual interests and the free flow of
information.
59. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 2(b).
60. See George et al., supra note 5, at 753.
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have a data controller, the person who is personally responsible 
for how the personal data will be processed within the specific 
business.61 The controller also has the responsibility to contact a
“supervisory authority” in the Member State before processing.62
The supervisory authority is an independent authority established 
by the Member State to monitor that the Privacy Directive is 
“implemented into national law.”63 However, the supervisory 
authority has significant powers; it can “block the transmittal of 
data, ban the processing of data, or destroy data processed in 
violation of the law.”64 This authority is also responsible to 
ensure that the data quality principles, listed in Article 6, are 
met.65
Article 6 provides that the Member State, through the 
controller, must ensure personal data is:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes 
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical 
or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible 
provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further 
processed;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
61. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 6(2) (emphasis added);
George et al., supra note 5, at 753.
62. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 18(1); George et al., supra
note 5, at 753-54.
63. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 18; George et al., supra
note 5, at 754.
64. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 28(3); George et al., supra
note 5, at 754.
65. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 28(2); George et al., supra
note 5, at 754.
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inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for
which they were collected or for which they are further
processed, are erased or rectified;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for
which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate 
safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for 
historical, statistical or scientific use.66
Generally, the requirements given to the controllers reflect 
four general obligations: data quality, security, notification, and 
how to complete processing.67
Article 7 provides a complete bar toward processing personal 
information.68 However, Article 7 explains that personal data 
may only be processed if the business meets one of the Privacy 
Directive exceptions.69 Article 7 exceptions state:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at 
the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; 
or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital
interests of the data subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
66. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 6.
67. Id. pmbl. para. 25.
68. Id. art. 7.
69. Id.
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authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom 
the data are disclosed; or
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection 
under Article 1 (1).70
In addition to the prohibition in Article 7, Article 8 also 
provides for a complete prohibition to “processing of personal 
data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious 
or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life,”71 also known 
as “sensitive information.” Similar to Article 7, Article 8 also 
allows processing if “the data subject has given his explicit 
consent,” but a Member State is allowed to provide a complete 
ban without exception.72
Articles 10, 11, and 12 refer to the data subject’s right to 
certain information. These articles include the information that 
must be given to the data subject before processing - such as the 
identity of the controller, the purpose for the processing, and the 
identity of the third party transfers.73 Most importantly, the 
articles provide the data subject with the right to access his or her 
information, as the data subject must be given the ability to edit 
and modify the information and keep the information correct.74
Finally, Article 25 and 26 are the most important articles 
when determining the effect of the Privacy Directive and the 
Safe Harbor Agreement. Article 25 is a complete prohibition 
against transfers of personal data to “third countries” (any 
country that is not a member of the European Union). However, 
Article 25 does permit transfers of personal data to third 
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 8.
72. Id.
73. See id. art. 10-12.
74. Id.
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countries if “the third country in question ensures an adequate 
level of protection.”75 Article 26 provides other exceptions than 
an “adequate level of protection,” such as unambiguous consent 
from the data subject or the transfer is necessary to complete a 
contract with the data subject.76 However, the European Union 
Commission added to the Article 26 exception by providing 
Standard Contractual Clauses.77 The standard form contract 
clauses provide the protection standard required by the Privacy 
Directive that can be negotiated into individual contracts and 
relied upon for supervisory authority approval in all member 
countries.78 The European Union Commission did not limit itself 
to the standard contract clauses or the exceptions provided in the 
Privacy Directive, the Commission negotiated and approved the 
Safe Harbor Agreement to provide a guaranty of “adequate 
protection” to companies in the United States.79
C. European Union-United States Safe Harbor Agreement
When the European Union adopted the Privacy Directive, the 
United States could not meet the “adequate protection”
standards. As a result of the Privacy Directive, United States 
businesses were faced with the potential loss of billions of 
dollars in annual transactions80 and a potential trade war between 
the two economic powers.81 Therefore, the United States 
Department of Commerce and the European Commission began 
an agreement to continue business between the countries. After 
75. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added). The European Commission
determines if the third country meets the adequate protection requirement. Id.
76. Id. art. 26.
77. Id.; see generally Commission Decision 2002/16/EC of 27 
December 2001 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal 
Data to Processors Established in Third Countries, Under Directive 95/46/EC, 
2002 O.J. (L 6) 52 [hereinafter Model Contracts].
78. Model Contracts, supra note 77, at 53; Privacy Directive, supra
note 54, art. 26(4).
79. Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 265.
80. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 18.
81. George et al., supra note 5, at 738-39.
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two years of negotiations, the European Union and the 
Department of Commerce settled for an agreement that enacted 
the European Union’s interest in the Privacy Directive protection 
requirement without requiring a wholesale change in the United 
States’ self- regulation approach.82 In July 2000, the European 
Union announced the acceptance of the Safe Harbor 
Agreement.83 Two very important elements of the Safe Harbor 
Agreement are 1) the Safe Harbor Agreement establishes the 
presumption of “adequate level of protection”84 and 2) the Safe 
Harbor Agreement is voluntary.85 If a business decided to enroll 
in the Safe Harbor Agreement, the business must comply with 
the principles and procedure set forth in the Safe Harbor 
Agreement.86 First, to enroll in the Safe Harbor Agreement, the 
business must self- certify annually to the Department of 
Commerce that they will follow the principles in the Agreement 
and declare its adherence to the Agreement publicly.87 By 
joining TRUSTe and/or BBBOnline, independent consumer 
watch/rating organizations specifically for online businesses, 
United States companies can fulfill the self-certifying 
requirement.88 Under the compliance requirements, the 
82. See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.
gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
83. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/
safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). Id. The Safe 
Harbor Agreement began November 1, 2000 and has been in place since. Id. In 
addition, the Safe Harbor Agreement is unique because other countries such as 
Canada must still adopt “adequate privacy protection” and cannot take the 
benefits of the Safe Harbor Agreement. See DOROTHEE HEISENBERG,
NEGOTIATING PRIVACY—THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 103 (2005).
84. George et al., supra note 5, at 764-65; U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Overview, supra note 83.
85. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 83.
86. See George et al., supra note 5, at 765; U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Overview, supra note 83.
87. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 83; George et al.,
supra note 5, at 765.
88. BBB EU Safe Harbor Program, BBB, http://www.bbb.org/
council/eusafeharbor/bbb-eu-safe-harbor-dispute-resolution-program/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013); EU Safe Harbor, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/
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businesses create a privacy policy89 that abides by the seven 
principles: notice, which acknowledges the purpose of 
processing;90 choice, which allows the data subject to “opt out”
or “opt in;”91 onward transfer, which provides the data subject 
with the same protection if a third party misuses the 
information;92 technical security, which protects the information 
from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, 
alteration and destruction;”93 data integrity, which limits the use 
of the information relevant to its purpose;94 access, which 
provides the data subject the ability to access and amend their 
personal information;95 and enforcement, which provides a 
means of recourse to investigate and resolve with respect to the 
principles.96
However, enforcement is not limited to the dispute resolution 
procedures provided in the business’s privacy policy. The data 
subject could report the business to the Federal Trade 
Commission97 or the European citizen can bring an action in the 
Member State.98 The FTC’s power is limited as it only has the 
power to enforce the privacy policies already adopted by the 
products-and-services/enterprise-privacy/eu-safe-harbor-sea (last visited Mar. 
30, 2013). Generally, you can find the TRUSTe and/or BBBonline symbols
on the company’s website.
89. The policy will also include the contact information for
complaints. George et al., supra note 5, at 766.
90. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 83.
91. George et al., supra note 5, at 767; U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Overview, supra note 83. The company must provide the data subject with
the necessary information. However, the data subject can decide to process
the information and the data subject must decide that he or she does not
want the personal information processed by opting-out. Id. Or, the company
could provide that the data subject must go out of his or her way to have the
information processed by opting-in. Id.





97. Id.; George et al., supra note 5, at 780.
98. George et. al., supra note 5, at 779.
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businesses.99 In addition, the data subjects rarely learn of the 
violation with his or her personal information, so the data 
subjects rarely take action on the violation.100
This problem is likely further escalated by the different 
legislation and additional restrictions of the Member States.101
The Privacy Directive sets a minimum standard and allows for 
the member countries to apply higher standards as long as the 
member countries’ standards do not restrict the flow of 
information between the member countries.102 By complying 
with the different standards in the different member countries, 
the businesses may have different standards for the different 
countries,103 and a layperson may find it difficult to determine 
which privacy policy applies to them. Since the Privacy 
Directive began in 1995, and the Safe Harbor Agreement in 
2000, some United States businesses were likely reluctant to join 
the Safe Harbor Agreement and conduct business in the 
European Union during the first two years104 because of the 
significant commitment of resources.105 Since 2002, big 
99. Id. at 779-80; Scott, supra note 41, at 129.
100. See Francoise Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New
Compliance Requirements in Sight – What the Proposed EU Data
Protection Regulation Means for U.S. Companies, 28 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 848-49 (2012).
101. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 11-12; Commission Staff Working 
Paper: Impact Assessment (Eur. Comm’n, Working Paper No. 25.1.2012 SEC 
(2012) 72 final 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_72_en.pdf.
102. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 1(2).
103. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1-4
(1997); LRDP KANTOR LIMITED & CENTRE FOR PUBLIC REFORM, COMPARATIVE 
STUDY ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW PROPERTY CHALLENGES, IN 
PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 31 (2010).
104. See David A. Tallman, Financial Institutions and the Safe
Harbor Agreement: Securing Cross-Border Financial Data Flows, 34 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 747, 773 (2003).
105. See James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-
U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145, 156-58 (2001); James A. Harvey & Kimberly
A. Verska, What the European Data Privacy Obligations Mean for U.S. 
Businesses, GIGALAW, http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/harvey-
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businesses like Microsoft, Apple, and Google106 have adapted 
and remained self-certified, sparking a strong interest in the Safe 
Harbor Agreement with hundreds of companies on the list.107
The Safe Harbor Agreement, however, has its critics. The critics 
argue the Safe Harbor Agreement does not follow the purpose of 
the Privacy Directive because of its difficulty in enforcing the 
privacy protections intended by the Privacy Directive.108
D. The Privacy Directive Legislation’s Compliance by 
Multinational Corporations
When the European Union passed the Privacy Directive in 
1995 and Member States subsequent legislation in 1998, the 
Privacy Directive forced restrictions and requirements on the 
companies located within the European Union. However, in the 
current global economy, companies are not singular entities with 
one location. Companies develop corporate structures that 
include subsidiary companies to operate, either independently or 
dependently, in different countries or regions all over the world.
These companies are known as multinational corporations. In the 
global economy, multinational corporations have data storage all 
over the world that can be accessed by the controlling 
company/location or the subsidiaries for efficiency. The transfer 
of information within the corporate structure shows that the 
Privacy Directive not only affects the companies that operate 
within Europe but also the locations and subsidiaries outside of 
the jurisdiction.
One may think that because one of the locations or 
subsidiaries in the European Union provides privacy protection 
under the Privacy Directive that the data may still be accessed by 
2001-02-pl.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); Joseph J. Laferrera,
Implications of the European Union Directive on Data Protection for US 
Companies, G E S M E R U P D E G R O V E L L P  (Mar. 17, 2005), 
http://www.gesmer.com/insights.php?NewsID=795.
106. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, EXPORT.GOV, http://safeharbor.
export.gov/list.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
107. See id.
108. Tallman, supra note 104.
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other locations of the corporation, permitting the company to run 
around Article 25 and/or the Safe Harbor Agreement. That is not 
the case, as each part of the multinational corporation that wants 
to access the information under the jurisdiction of the European 
Union must adhere to the Article 25 adequate protection 
requirement.109 In addition, the EU location of the multinational 
corporation must obtain the consent from the data subject under 
the Privacy Directive and Member State’s legislation, unless it is 
required to perform a contract.110 The adequate protection 
standard has frustrated multinational corporations because they 
cannot access employment records, for example, without consent 
and adequate protection.111 However, a multinational corporation 
is not completely prohibited from access. They could acquire 
consent through the employment contract or enter the Safe 
Harbor Program.
E. Differences between the United States and the 
European Union approaches
Americans may wonder why the European Union considered 
the Privacy Directive necessary. The quick answer is that the 
United States and the EU have different beliefs and approaches 
to privacy. For example, Europeans believe that privacy is a 
fundamental right and it is the responsibility of the government 
to protect privacy, whereas Americans believe that privacy is a 
commodity that can be traded away for economic benefits.
Americans generally have a “healthy” distrust of the 
government and a traditional hands-off approach to regulation.
The federal government has usually only regulated when there 
109. Zack Whittaker, Safe Harbor: Why EU Data Needs ‘Protecting’
from US Law, ZDNET (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
igeneration/safe-harbor-why-eu-data-needs-protecting-from-us-law/8801; see
also European Data Privacy: Beware of the Pitfalls, SMITH, GAMBRELL &
RUSSELL, LLP, http://www.sgrlaw.com/print/?id=2047 (last visited Jan. 22,
2013).
110. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 7(b); Model Contracts,
supra note 77.
111. George et al., supra note 5, at 768-78.
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was a need created by the market, and, without a need, trusted 
the market would regulate itself.112 Since the Revolutionary era, 
Americans have feared the government collecting and 
controlling information about the citizens, considering the 
British government obtained private information and misused it 
for public perception and criminal acts.113 In fact, the Bill of 
Rights is evidence that Americans feared the collection of 
information through the British’s methods. While some 
industries over-extend themselves and the government has 
stepped in and placed restrictions on the industries, the hands-off 
approach and the reactionary regulation is predominately true for 
privacy in the United States.
On the other hand in Europe, beginning in the 1970s, 
Germany passed the first comprehensive privacy protection.114
When Germany established the privacy protection, the country 
had in its mind the horrible acts, murders, and torture that 
resulted from the misuse of information by Hitler’s secret 
police.115 The government saw privacy as a right, and the right 
needed to be protected by placing the necessary restrictions on 
collections resulting from the proliferation of data from the 
Information Age. The government enforced these restrictions.116
Once Germany passed a comprehensive privacy protection, other 
European countries, such as Sweden, passed similar 
protections.117 The motivation was possibly due to witnessing the 
horrible acts resulting from the KGB’s collection and misuse of 
112. See generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-faire and Liberty:
A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985) (describing the 
laissez-fair approach, historically taken by the United States).
113. The United States government adopted the Bill of Rights to limit
the federal government’s power in response British authority before and
during the American Revolution. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, no. 84, 
575--81, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/bill_of_rightss7.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
114. Dash, supra note 7; see also Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note
105, at 148.
115. See George et al., supra note 5, at 743; Dash, supra note 7.
116. See Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 105, at 148.
117. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 32 (1997).
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information, due to the economic strength/market power 
Germany built after World War II, or a combination of both.
III. EUROPEAN UNION GENERAL DATA REGULATION
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission released its 
plans to completely reform data protection in the European 
Union, known as the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation 
(Data Regulation).118 It also released the proposed regulation to 
obtain input for the final regulation that the European 
Commission plans to adopt by 2015.119 In many ways the 
proposed Data Regulation would operate the same way as the 
Privacy Directive, but the Data Regulation stems from the 
principle established by the European Union in 2010. In 2010, 
the European Union clearly specified a desire to “shift to a single 
law that would be common to all of the Member States.”120 The 
purpose behind the reform is to place more responsibilities on 
the companies with the processed data, give more rights to the 
citizens, and reduce the costs of compliance for the companies.121
However, the main purpose is the current fragmentation and 
incoherence under the Privacy Directive.122 Currently, when 
businesses operate in multiple Member States, the businesses 
must follow each of the Member States’ Privacy Directive 
legislation. Since the Privacy Directive only established a 
minimum standard for personal data protection and processing, 
the Member States were able to establish higher standards, which 
some did. With varying standards, businesses have been forced 
to comply with the different requirements for each Member 
State, redundantly performing tasks for each Member State.123
118. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 815.
119. Id. at 816.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 818.
122. The Proposed General Data Protection Regulation: The
Consistency Mechanism Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 2, 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/130206_en.htm
[hereinafter Regulation Explained].
123. See generally id.
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The European Commission sought to remove those barriers by 
establishing one unified regulation for businesses and one 
application by the European Data Protection Board, with some 
discretion remaining for the European Commission.124
When the European Commission revealed the Data 
Regulation, it also revealed the Police and Criminal Justice Data 
Protection Directive.125 The Police and Criminal Justice Data 
Protection Directive would apply like the Privacy Directive and 
the Member States would follow the guidelines set by the 
Directive when establishing the Member States’ legislation.126
Under this new E.U. Criminal Data Protection Directive, the 
Member States would develop legislation that would allow data 
collection and processing by the authorities for preventing, 
investigating, detecting, or prosecuting criminal offenses and the 
free movement of data.127 The E.U. Criminal Data Protection 
Directive is also opened for changes to the final version.128 While 
the European Commission revealed both documents as a part of 
a plan, this note will only consider the Data Regulation in detail.
A. Developing the Data Regulation
Since the European Union approved the Privacy Directive in 
1995, the organization has modified its operation, as it
previously operated like a confederation, with relatively limited 
power.129 However, in December 2009, the Member States 
ratified the Lisbon Treaty130 and established a streamlined 
124. Id.
125. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 820.
126. Id at 816-17.
127. Id. at 820.
128. Id. at 820-21.
129. See id. at 821-22.
130. The European Union, after the Treaty of Lisbon, with its
structure and day-to-day function, appears similar to the United States. Like
the United States, the European Union has three branches with committees
and other subdivision that could be compared to the United States’
administrative agencies. The European Union also is the single
representative of all of the Member State for the areas that the European
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process so the 27 Member States could operate as one unified 
body under the European Union,131 similar to the United States’
development of a centralized federal government in the 1780s.
Under the ratified treaty, the Member States established a 
bicameral legislature with the Council of Ministers, known as the 
European Parliament, and established a long term President of 
the European Council, an executive figure.132 Almost a year after 
ratification of the European Union’s new power, the European 
Officials announced their intent to reform the data protection.133
Although the European Union revealed a new document, with 
a different title and different effect on the Member States, the 
Data Regulation does not substantially differ from policies 
adopted in the Privacy Directive.134 In fact, the 119-page Data 
Regulation possibly provides a more detailed protection of 
personal data and provides more protection to the data subject 
among other things.135 However, due to the substantial 
similarities between the Privacy Directive and the Data 
Regulation, this note will focus on the provisions of the Data 
Regulation that differ, the effect from those differences, and the 
essential provisions for enforcement.
Union has the power to regulate or adopt policy in; essentially like the state
governments in the United States, the Member States maintain their own
governmental system. However, unlike the states that compose the United
States, the Member State are seen as an individual entity in foreign affairs
and can adopt foreign policy on their own, except when the European Union
is controlling in the specific area. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 
13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C306) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml
.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:en:HTML.
131. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 822-23; Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6901353.stm
[hereinafter Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty].
132. Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty, supra note 131.
133. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 823.
134. See generally Regulation Explained, supra note 122.
135. See generally id.
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B. The Data Regulation versus the Privacy Directive
When the European Union decided to reform its personal data 
protection policies, it had to decide between a reformed directive 
and a new regulation. According to one source, the European 
Union considered that “EU regulations are the most direct form 
of EU law. As soon as a regulation is passed, it automatically 
becomes part of the national legal system of each Member 
State.”136 On the other hand, the European Union also considered 
that “EU directives . . . are used to bring different national laws 
in-line with each other. Once a directive is passed at the 
European Union level, each Member State must implement or 
‘transpose’ the directive into its legal system. . . . A directive 
only takes effect through national legislation that implements the 
measures.”137
Beginning with Article 1, the Data Regulation, like the 
Privacy Directive, maintains the European Union’s view on 
privacy protection through defining privacy as a human right and 
other actions.138 One of the key differences with the purpose of 
the Data Regulation from the Privacy Directive is that the Data 
“Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of 
individuals.”139 Article 2 of the Data Regulation provides that the 
regulation applies to all processing of personal data except for 
exclusions such as national security and criminal investigation,140
which is exactly like the Privacy Directive.141
Article 3 is the first instance where the Data Regulation 
significantly differs from the Privacy Directive. Article 3 
136. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 823.
137. Id. at 824.
138. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 1, 
COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Data Regulation], available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0011:FIN:
EN:PDF.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. See Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 2.
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provides the regulation applies when the controller is within the 
European Union, when processing occurs within the European 
Union, and/or when laws of the Member State would apply 
under public international law.142 Article 3 of the Data 
Regulation is different from the Privacy Directive because, first, 
the Privacy Directive never identified the jurisdiction and, 
second, the jurisdiction is too broad to cover the reach of Internet 
users.143
Under Article 4, the Data Regulation established definitions 
for the Data Regulation that includes similar definitions to the 
Privacy Directive, especially for the definitions listed above.144
However, Article 4 is different than the Privacy Directive 
because the Data Regulation includes more specific terms.145
Similar to Article 5 of the Privacy Directive, the Data Regulation 
contains the same principles for personal data processing.146
Under the principles in Article 5, Personal data must be:
(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner . . . ;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes . . .
;
(c) adequate, relevant, and limited to the . . . purposes for
which they are processed . . . ;
(d) accurate and kept up to date; every reasonable step . . . to 
ensure that personal data that are inaccurate . . . are erased or 
rectified without delay;
(e) kept . . . no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the personal data are processed; personal data may be 
stored for longer periods insofar as the data will be processed 
142. Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 3.
143. See Privacy Directive, supra note 54.
144. See discussion, infra Sec.II.C.
145. Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 4.
146. Id. art. 5.
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solely for historical, statistical or scientific research purposes . 
. . ;
(f) processed under the responsibility and liability of the 
controller, who shall ensure and demonstrate for each 
processing operation the compliance with the provisions of 
(E.U. General Data) Regulation.147
Article 6 of the Data Regulation elaborated the principles of 
the regulation by identifying how the personal data may be 
processed. Processing is only lawful if one of the following 
applies:
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing .
. . for one or more specific purposes;
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is party or . . . at the request of the 
data subject prior to entering into a contract;
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject;
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital
interests of the data subject;
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller;
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by a controller, except . . . overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject which require protection of personal data, in particular
where the data subject is a child. This [is] not app[licable] to
processing . . . by public authorities.148
147. Id.
148. Id. art. 6.
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The principles enumerated in the Data Regulation may not 
use the exact language as the principles of Article 6 of the 
Privacy Directive, but the principles are substantively the 
same.149 However, Article 6 is not just limited to the lawfulness 
of the processing listed above. Article 6 considers processing for 
historical, statistical, or scientific research consistent with the 
safeguard under Article 83 of the Data Regulation.150 Finally, 
Article 6 also requires that paragraphs (c) and (e) from paragraph 
1 can only apply when the basis for processing is established 
under European Union law or the law of the Member State under 
which the controller is subject.151
Article 7 is a unique departure from the Privacy Directive.
Article 7 is specifically about how businesses can obtain 
personal information. Under the Privacy Directive, companies
generally had the option to give the data subjects the opportunity 
to “opt-in” or “opt-out”152 because the Privacy Directive only 
required “unambiguous consent.” When the Member States 
attempted to define “unambiguous consent,” they defined 
“unambiguous consent” as the data subject clearly understanding 
why his or her data will be processed and the identity of the data 
processor without legalese.153 However, the Data Regulation 
requires the data subject consents to processing for specific 
purposes. The specific purpose requirement limits how much the 
personal data can be proliferated because the processor must 
obtain consent for reason the information is processed. The Data 
Regulation is not limited to consent on specific purposes, but
also imposes the following burdens:
149. See id. The Data Regulation appears to be more lenient and




152. See Privacy Directive, supra note 54, arts. 6-7 (the opt-in/opt-out
requirement stems from the Article 7 and Article 8 requirement of the E.U.
Privacy Directive).
153. Id. art. 7.
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1. The controller shall bear the burden of proof for the data
subject’s consent to the processing of their personal data for 
specified purposes.
2. If the data subject’s consent is to be given in the context of 
a written declaration which also concerns another matter, the 
requirement to give consent must be presented distinguishable 
in its appearance from this other matter.154
The burden shift requires the processors to prove that they 
obtained the consent from the data subject. With the new 
requirement, the processors are likely to be explicit to obtain 
consent so there would be little or no question about the data 
subject’s consent to the processing.
In Article 8 of the Data Regulation, the European Union 
explicitly protects and prohibits the processing of children’s155
personal data.156 However, children’s data can be processed if the 
child’s parent consents to the processing.157 Article 8 also places 
requirements on the controller to verify the parent actually gave 
consent.158
Article 9 specifically prohibits processing certain types of 
personal information, including “revealing race or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religion or beliefs, trade- union membership, 
and the processing of genetic data or data concerning health or 
sex life or criminal convictions or related security measures.”159
This special data is known as sensitive data under the Privacy 
Directive and the Data Regulation. However, the Data 
Regulation does allow this strict prohibition to be waived if the 
data subject has given consent pursuant to Article 7 and Article 
8.160 While Article 9 provides more requirements than in Article 
154. Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 7.
155. Id. art. 8 (the Regulation defines a child as a data subject who is




159. Id. art. 9.
160. Id.
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7 and Article 8, the exemptions to the strict prohibition in Article 
9 of the Data Regulation are the same exemptions to the 
sensitive data prohibition in the Privacy Directive.
Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 provide that the data subject 
must be given certain information. Within these articles, the Data 
Regulation provides that the controller must provide clear 
information and communication about the data subject’s rights in 
an “intelligible form.”161 Article 14 specifically provides that the 
following information at a minimum must be provided to the 
data subject:
(a) the identity and the contact details of the controller and, if 
any, of the controller’s representative and of the data 
protection officer;
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data
are intended, including the contract terms and general 
conditions where the processing is based on point (b) of 
Article 6(1) and the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 
6(1);
(c) the period for which the personal data will be stored;
(d) the existence of the right to request from the controller 
access to and rectification or erasure of the personal data
concerning the data subject or to object to the processing of 
such personal data;
(e) the right to lodge a complaint to the supervisory authority 
and the contact details of the supervisory authority;
(f) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal 
data;
161. See id. arts. 11-15. Intelligible form likely means intelligible to
the data subject and is not in legalese so the data subject can understand the
information.
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(g) where applicable, that the controller intends to transfer to a 
third country or international organi[z]ation and on the level of
protection afforded by that third country or international
organi[z]ation by reference to an adequacy decision by the 
Commission;
(h) any further information necessary to guarantee fair 
processing in respect of the data subject, having regard to
the specific circumstances in which the personal data are 
collected.162
Finally, the articles provide the data subjects with the “Right 
to Access” their information. Like the Privacy Directive, the 
Data Regulation provides data subjects with the “Right to 
Access” the information obtained from them.163 Accordingly, 
Article 16 provides the data subject with the ability to modify 
and correct the data subject’s personal and sensitive data.164
However, the Data Regulation does not end with the “Right to 
Access.” Article 17 of the Data Regulation provides data 
subjects with the “Right to Be Forgotten.”165 “The data subject 
shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of 
personal data relating to them and the abstention from further 
dissemination of such data.”166 While there appears to be a 
general right by the data subject to erase his or her information, 
the Data Regulation requires one of the following to apply:
(a) the data are no longer necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise 
processed;
162. Id. art. 14. Article 14 also provides instances when the
information does not need to be provided to the data subject. Id. art. 14.
Article 14 gives the European Union Commission the authority to adopt a
standard form to disseminate the required information. Id. art. 14.
163. Id. art. 15.
164. Id. art. 16.
165. Id. art. 17.
166. Id.
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(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the 
processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or 
when the storage period consented to has expired, and where 
there is no other legal ground for the processing of the data;
(c) the data subject objects to the processing of personal data 
pursuant to Article 19;
(d) the processing of the data does not comply with this
Regulation for other reasons.167
Similar to the other articles in the Data Regulation, Article 17, 
while giving the “Right to be Forgotten” to the data subject, 
establishes specific instances when the controller does not need 
to delete the data subject’s personal and sensitive data.168
However, Article 17 also lays out how the controller must handle 
the data subject’s deletion request.169
While the European Union adopted the Safe Harbor 
Agreement with the United States, the Data Regulation 
maintains the Privacy Directive’s prohibition towards 
transferring information to third countries that do not possess 
adequate privacy protection.170 Article 40 contains the general 
provision that prohibits the transfer, processing, etc. of data of 
citizens of the European Union by third countries unless third 
countries have the adequate privacy protection.171 Similar to the 
Privacy Directive, the European Commission retains the power 
to declare a third country protection as adequate. However, 
Article 41 of the Data Regulation is explicit about its ability to 
determine adequacy and how the Commission should go about 




170. See id. art. 40.
171. Id. The language for Article 40 of the Data Regulation is about
the same language from Article 25 of the Privacy Directive. See id.; Privacy
Directive, supra note 54, art. 25.
172. Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 41. Article 41 states:
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power to the Commission, but, under the Privacy Directive, the 
Member States retained some power to authorize transfers to the 
third countries, which the Member States do not have under the 
Data Regulation.173 If the Commission has not determined the 
adequacy of a third country, the controller can proceed if one of 
the safeguards from Article 42 is in place.174 Article 42 
references, and Article 43 elaborates on what are known as 
binding corporate rules.175 Binding corporate rules affect and are 
established by the individual company, which is completely 
different then the adequate protection requirement because it 
does bind the entire country. The binding corporate rule 
provision is similar to the Safe Harbor Agreement because it 
does not require the entire country to have adequate protection 
under the Data Regulation and is enforced by the policies 
established by the individual companies.
The final notable difference between the Data Regulation and 
the Privacy Directive is the notification of a data breach found in 
Article 31 and 32. Article 31 requires notification to the 
When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission
shall give consideration to the following elements:
(a) the rule of law, relevant legislation in force, both general and sectoral, 
including concerning public security, defence, national security and criminal 
law, the professional rules and security measures which are complied with
in that country or by that international organisation, as well as effective and
enforceable rights including effective administrative and judicial redress for
data subjects, in particular for those data subjects residing in the Union whose 
personal data are being transferred;
(b) the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent
supervisory authorities in the third country or international organisation in 
question responsible for ensuring compliance with the data protection rules,
for assisting and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for
co- operation with the supervisory authorities of the Union and of Member
States; and
(c) the international commitments the third country or international
organisation in question has entered into.
Id.
173. Cf. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 5.
174. Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 42.
175. See id. arts. 42-43. The Data Regulation establishes the minimum
requirements for the company’s binding corporate rules. See id. art. 43.
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regulatory agency within 24 hours of the breach.176 Article 32 
requires communication of the data breach to the data subject.177
Articles 31 and 32 are important and consistent with the overall 
theme of the Data Regulation by giving the data subject more 
control over his or her personal and/or sensitive information. By 
communicating the breach to the data subject, the data subject 
will have sufficient knowledge to determine if he or she would 
like to either be “forgotten” or continue keeping his or her data 
with the business. The purpose behind notifying the regulatory 
agency in the affected Member State(s) would assist in 
enforcement, making sure the security protection is sufficient 
and the processor fulfills its obligations under the Data 
Regulation.
C. The Data Regulation and the Safe Harbor Agreement
While the Data Regulation mirrors the Privacy Directive in 
key areas, the Data Regulation still differs in the key areas that 
may affect how United States companies operate in the E.U. 
pursuant to the Safe Harbor Agreement. The purpose of this 
section is to consider if the Safe Harbor Agreement can continue 
as it is under the principles and policies behind the Data 
Regulation. While it is impossible for Safe Harbor Agreement to 
continue the status quo, United States businesses can continue 
functionally in the same way, fulfilling the principles and 
policies from the Data Regulation without a wholesale change in 
privacy protection.
With the additional rights in the Data Regulation from the 
Privacy Directive, the additional rights must be transposed to the 
Safe Harbor Agreement. Currently under the Safe Harbor 
Agreement, United States companies must create a privacy 
policy incorporating the seven principles discussed above:178
choice, notice, onward transfer, technical security, data integrity, 
access, and enforcement. The notice principle under the Privacy 
176. Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 31.
177. Id. art. 32.
178. See discussion, supra sec. II.C.
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Directive only requires notice about why the data is collected, 
but notice under the Data Regulation also requires notice about 
security breaches. To require notice about security breaches 
could also fall under the technical security principle because the 
companies will increase their security protection to prevent data 
breaches. The Data Regulation’s notice requirement would allow 
the data subjects to stay informed about their data, allow the data 
subject to maintain their consent, and help with enforcing the 
lawful processing and transferring to third parties.
The Data Regulation also requires United States companies to 
provide a greater level of access to the data subject. Instead of 
solely allowing the data subjects to access their data to correct 
and update the information, the Data Regulation will require the 
companies to provide the data subjects with the ability to delete
their data, modifying the access principle of the Safe Harbor 
Agreement. This increased access would also require the 
companies to provide greater technical security. With more 
access by the data subjects, the companies will need to increase 
the security to ensure that only the specific data subject will be 
able to access his or her data.
The Data Regulation’s change in the requirements for consent 
and onward transfer will force a change in the choice and 
onward transfer principles as well. Instead of the traditional “opt-
in” or “opt-out” consent requirement, the Data Regulation 
requires the data subject’s consent for each purpose of 
processing. This change will likely require companies to contact 
each data subject to obtain consent about each additional purpose 
and each onward transfer, with the communication monthly or 
annually. This modification to consent in the Data Regulation is 
relatively similar to the data integrity principle, limiting the data 
to relevant use related to the original purpose. However, the 
companies must obtain consent for each purpose and explain 
each purpose to the data subject, as well as identify the controller 
for the onward transfers. The companies also retain the burden to 
prove the data subject consented to the processing. The
explanations and surely numerous purposes for processing 
personal and sensitive data will likely result in countless pages of 
a user agreement for the data subject to read. However, this sort 
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of reaction by companies will be limited because Article 11 
requires the information be provided to the data subject in an 
“intelligible form.”179
Finally, the companies will likely continue to operate as a 
result of the binding corporate rules provision from Article 32 
while providing the necessary rights to the data subject. The 
binding corporate rules exception appears to be the European 
Union’s incorporation of the Safe Harbor Agreement skeleton 
into its proposed Data Regulation. Like the Safe Harbor 
Agreement, the binding corporate rule provision focuses on an 
individual company’s privacy protection, not an entire country.
Also like the Safe Harbor Agreement, this provision requires 
individual companies to adopt policies/rules to protect the data 
that are enforceable against the company. The provision provides 
for binding corporate rules that are consistent with the other 
articles of the Data Regulation. Therefore, based on the 
similarities between the binding corporate rules and the simple 
changes required by the Data Regulation, United States 
businesses can continue their business in the European Union 
under the Safe Harbor Agreement.
IV. BREAKING GROUND FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY 
STANDARD
This section will consider the effect of the Privacy Directive 
towards voluntary and involuntary compliance with the 
European Union’s privacy standards by individual 
companies/industries. This section will also consider the Privacy 
Directive’s political and sovereign effect on global powers, 
focusing primarily on the United States. Finally, this section will 
conclude by weighing the self-regulatory approach’s entrenched 
179. This issue will be determined by the definition if intelligible form. 
However, based on the Data Regulation’s pro-data subject policies and roll 
over from the Privacy Directive, it should be safe to assume intelligible form 
will be determined from the reasonable data subject’s perspective. Until this 
definition is binding, “intelligible form” will be the subject for the European
Commission’s consideration. See Data Regulation, supra note 138, art. 11.
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effect on an international online privacy regulation, and will 
ultimately determine the European Union’s approach will lead to 
a global privacy standard based on the effects the Privacy 
Directive has already had on the global powers and the potential 
effect the Data Regulation will have.
A. European Union’s Market Effect Creating an 
International Standard
The European Union began as a method for the Member 
States to unify their economic interest in the steel industry into 
an international economy, known as the European Coal and Steel 
Community.180 When the original six countries joined together, 
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg, these countries were global powers.181 Soon after 
the original organization’s formation, the Member States 
recognized the strength of their combined influence and the 
resulting benefits of a single European market, so they wanted to 
increase these benefits. This change was accomplished by a 
name change and expanding the role/power of the organization 
from an industry-specific decision to an economic-related 
decision to barriers to entry. By unifying their interests, the 
European Union has become a force to be reckoned with.
Over the organization’s development, the number of Member 
States grew, and, with the growth, the organization’s market and 
influence grew too. Currently, the European Union sits at the 
top, as one of the most important, if not the most important 
economic market in the world.182 A basic economic principle 
dictates that businesses operate where the opportunity to make 
180. European Communities, CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_
european_communities-en-3940ef1d-7c10-4d0f-97fc-0cf1e86a32d4.html (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2014).
181. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 
ECSC Treaty, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_
affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
182. See Trade: Committed to Free and Fair Trade, European Union, 
http://europa.eu/pol/comm/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
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money is located,183 and, to follow the money, companies will 
continue to make the necessary accommodations to remain in the 
market, so long as the costs of the accommodations do not 
outweigh the potential gain/profit.184 This principle is applicable 
to the European Union because companies will accommodate 
and follow the European regulations to maintain their presence 
in the European Market.
When the European Union established the Privacy Directive, 
companies followed this basic principle and modified their 
networks to accommodate the privacy requirements. By placing 
restrictions on processing data, the European Union also placed 
restrictions on conducting business in the European Union 
because, in the online economy, processing data is necessary to 
complete transactions. Accommodating the Privacy Directive 
requirements has already limited some companies’ profits 
because they would sell the information for profit and/or use the 
information to decrease costs by targeting customers that are 
now restricted under the Privacy Directive.
While the Privacy Directive was immediately applied to 
European companies and subsidiary companies located in 
Europe, the privacy accommodations were not as swift for the 
third countries defined by Article 25. This delay can be 
attributed to at least three reasons. First, and the most obvious 
from Article 25, the third countries took their time to adopt the 
necessary legislation to have “adequate protection.” The third 
countries had to transition and adopt privacy legislation unique 
to the countries’ regulatory structure and ideology.185 However, 
183. Depending on the amount of demand for a specific good or
service, more businesses for the good and/or service will be drawn to the
area.
184. Also, due to the European Market effects other countries are
effectively powerless to retaliate against the high privacy protection
standards. Shaffer, sup ra  note  13 ,  a t  8.
185. See HEISENBERG, supra note 83, at 103. Countries wanted to 
develop strict standards to ensure its companies could compete in the 
European Market. Id. However, the third country companies are likely able to 
operate in Europe through a subsidiary formed in the EU. The subsidiary will 
be an extension of the parent corporation, but the subsidiary would maintain
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the third countries wanted to get back into the European Market 
as fast as possible. To minimize the delay, the countries would 
essentially copy and paste a Member State’s Privacy Directive 
legislation to acquire the adequate protection label. This desire to 
enter the European Market as fast as possible and the method to 
accomplish the goal likely contributed to the domino effect 
discussed later.186
The second reason for the delay is the cost of compliance.
While the Privacy Directive specifically enumerated the rights of 
the data subjects and the responsibilities of the individual 
companies, companies still had to implement the necessary 
technology to accommodate the Privacy Directive, such as 
additional security to prevent a breach.187 Increasing the security 
could cost a single company millions of dollars annually for one 
website,188 and, as the company obtains more protected 
information, the cost of compliance will continue to increase.189
Another factor adding to the cost of compliance is the 
differences between the Member States’ privacy legislation. The 
differences typically provide some citizens more privacy 
protection than other states and would cost companies more to 
comply with varying standards.190 In fact, the costs of 
some independence such as preventing processing of information obtained
within the control of the European Union. Lokke Moerel, Back 2 Basics: When 
Does the EU Privacy Directive (and its implementation law) Apply?, OXFORD,
15-16 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.cambridgeforums.com/ww.ad
min/materials/privacy/Back_to_Basics_WP%2029%20Paper.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014).
186. See discussion infra Sec. IV.A.
187. Data Security: A Growing Liability Threat, ZURICH, (2009), 3-4, 
http://uszicc.zurichna.com/media/ZHP%20Delivered/files/DODataSecurityWhi
tepaper.pdf.
188. See id. Zeek.com, a small child’s site, estimated the
accommodations would cost $200,000 annually. Angela Vitale, Note, The 
EU Privacy Directive and the Resulting Safe Harbor: The Negative Effects on 
U.S. Legislation Concerning Privacy on the Internet. 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 321, 350 (Jan. 2002), http://www.idg.net/crd_idgsearch.
189. Vitale, supra note 188, at 351.
190. See HEISENBERG, supra note 83, at 103. Companies have provided
data subjects with equal privacy protection not a result of lawsuits or 
government threats but protecting their public images. In addition, applying
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compliance deter small companies from entering the European 
market,191 which monopolizes the market for the multinational 
corporations.
Finally, companies were reluctant to accommodate the 
changes because costs may outweigh the benefits of competing 
in the European Market. Without comprehensive privacy in the 
United States, companies will consider treating the U.S. market 
and the European market differently. The companies could 
provide the privacy protection to the European market and not 
the United States. However, it would be costly and unpopular for 
the legislature to treat United States citizens as second class to 
Europeans.192 Additionally, the maintenance of two different 
standards is also costly for companies.193 In the alternative, 
treating everybody the same will also cost the companies 
because they could no longer sell and profit from the information 
from anybody. With equal treatment, the companies will pass the 
costs to the consumers, so for non-European companies their 
goods or services will be more expensive than domestic 
products.194
Regardless of the cause or length of the delay, European-
based companies obtained an advantage from the delay. They 
different privacy standards creates in imperfection in the market that will force 
a correction to find ways to continue using data subjects’ information for 
profit. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 31-33.
191. Privacy Concerns, supra note 8.
192. Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 105, at 156. In fact from my 
experience, companies like Best Buy and Starbucks provided United States 
citizens with the same protection as citizens in the European Union by giving 
all subjects the ability to opt-out of some portions. See Privacy Public,
STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/about-us/company-information/online-
policies/privacy-policy (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Privacy Policy, BESTBUY,
http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Help-Topics/Privacy-Policy/pcmcat20440005
0062.c?id=pcmcat204400050062 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
193. Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 105, at 156.
194. The increased costs to comply accompanied with low benefits
from being in the European Market made companies consider not operating
in the European Market. However, excluding the European Market entails 
additional costs besides the loss of business. The companies must ensure their 
website is not accessible in the Member States and maintain the prohibition.
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had no decision in compliance and continued operating because 
the scope of the Privacy Directive included all of the processing 
activities by the European companies. The Privacy Directive 
caused the delay and gave the first mover advantage to the 
European companies because third countries businesses could 
not compete until adequate protection was acknowledged as well 
as meeting the individual Member States’ requirements. 
However, this is not an egregious advantage because there are 
numerous subsidiaries from multinational corporations located 
throughout Europe that each had to comply with the Privacy 
Directive aside from the other locations of the corporation.195
As third countries adopted legislation with adequate privacy 
protection, the domino theory will apply to other third countries.
When the third countries adopted the adequate privacy
protection, they protected against the onward transfer by 
applying the same requirements as the European Union. As more 
and more countries unconditionally adopt adequate protection
legislation to compete in the European Market, smaller countries 
will adopt the adequate protection legislation for their companies 
to compete in the third country’s market, and, like the Member 
States, the protection would apply to every company operating in 
the third country. Other third countries will not want to give 
business to a regional competitor and possibly allow another 
country to become the regional economic hegemony.196
However, the domino effect can only apply if third countries 
enforce their privacy protection legislation and continue to adopt 
adequate protection legislation to gain access to the market.
195. See discussion, supra sec. II.D.
196. See STEVEN E. LOBELL, THE CHALLENGE OF HEGEMONY: GRAND 
STRATEGY, TRADE, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 1-2 (2005). An example would
include the United States and Safe Harbor Agreement after Canada acquired
the adequate protection status. DONALD C. DOWLING, JR. & JEREMY MITTEN,
INTERNATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY LAW 26 (White & Case
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The domino effect is minimal under the Data Regulation with 
the adequacy protection accompanying the binding corporate 
rules. An element of the binding corporate rules requires the 
rules be enforceable against the corporation. However, the 
binding corporate rules do not force third countries to develop 
adequate protection in the entire country. Therefore, the adequate 
protection requirement of the Privacy Directive created a domino 
effect in the market toward an international privacy standard, but 
the Data Regulation will likely negate the domino effect because 
the privacy protection can be on a company-to-company basis.
B. European Union Jurisdiction and the Lessor of Two 
Evils
The scope of the Privacy Directive is expansive toward data 
processing, which allows enforcement of the Member States 
laws to extend beyond the European Union boarders.197
However, this brings about the question of whether the European 
Union’s jurisdiction can reach third countries. The short answer 
is yes. American lawyers would likely think back to Civil 
Procedure and ask whether there is personal jurisdiction? A
sovereign country can pass any legislation the country wants.198
For example, while American jurisprudence would give personal 
jurisdiction to the courts,199 the United States courts can still 
only enforce judgments over assets within the United States 
boarders. So, the issue becomes whether the European Union can 
enforce legislation within another country? More specifically, 
can the European Union interfere with another country’s
197. For the purposes of this subsection, when I reference the
European Union it will refer to the Member States’ law enacted for the
Privacy Directive requirement.
198. Axel Spies, Global Data Protection: Whose Rules Govern?, 12
SEDONA CONF. J. 105, 120 (2011).
199. See generally Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002)
(holding that the defendant must purposefully avail itself with an interactive
website), see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480
U.S. 102 (1987) (requiring a purposeful instead of a passive act to establish
personal jurisdiction).
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sovereign right?200 Typically, countries do not infringe on 
another’s sovereign right to govern. However, countries bind 
themselves through treaties, agreements, or organizations that 
allow for enforcement within another country, such as the 
international treaties over the high seas.201 The Privacy Directive 
does not follow the enforcement through international agreement 
because this enforcement is typically unilateral. This does not 
mean that countries have not mutually agreed on jurisdiction for 
the transfer of information.202 However, the European Union’s
unilateral enforcement can occur because of Article 25 of the 
Privacy Directive, which essentially allows the European Union 
to ban a third country that does not submit to the European 
Union.203 The threat is influential because of the European 
Market’s power as discussed above.204
While countries may willingly submit to the European 
Union’s law by passing adequate protection legislation, the 
courts outside of the European Union are not as willing to 
enforce the Privacy Directive. One purpose of an international 
agreement or treaty is to establish when to apply another 
country’s laws and choice of law decisions. U.S. courts generally 
do not weigh economic principles and political agendas when 
200. Either the data subject or by an authority, on behalf the data
subject, would bring an action, but the suit would began in Europe. This
discussion does not consider the multinational corporation that has
subsidiaries in Europe. Due to the physical presence, there is no doubt they
can enforce against the corporation. This discussion is intended to consider
the corporations whose only presence in Europe is virtual.
201. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
202. See Spies, supra note 198, at 117. The United States and the
European Union agreed on the SWIFT database to stop the funding of
terrorism.
203. The European Union likely wants its courts to enforce outside of
the territory for its citizens rights. The Privacy Directive is centered on
protecting and enforcing the data subject’s rights. Enforcement from the
European Union gives power to the data subject because it reduces the costs
for the data subject. The data subject would not have to pay for litigation
outside of the country, which makes it possible for the data subject to
enforce his or her rights.
204. See discussion supra sec. IV.A.
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determining the applicable law. The Privacy Directive does not 
contain a choice of law provision.205 Therefore, it is not only 
unclear for courts to determine applicable law, but it is also 
unclear for everyone else.
This specifically creates a problem when two countries have 
conflicting law. For example, the United States has disclosure 
requirements by companies that would be illegal under the 
Privacy Directive. Therefore, companies that hit this wall must 
decide between violating the lesser of two evils, unless they 
obtain informed consent to transfer to someone with adequate 
protection. The travel industry, such as airplanes and 
shipping/cruises, is substantially affected by this requirement.206
When a plane arrives in the United States, the Department of 
Homeland Security requires a passenger manifest to cross-
reference for potential terrorists.207 However, the company only 
collected the information for a proof of purchase.208 By 
transferring this information to the DHS, the companies would 
violate the Privacy Directive because this transfer would be for a 
purpose other than why the company collected the 
information.209 Therefore, the company would open itself to 
penalties from the United States government for not following 
US law or civil liability from the data subjects.210 Typically, the 
penalties and fines imposed by the United States are harsher than 
some Member States.211 In addition, United States law requires
205. While the Privacy Directive does not have a choice of law
provision, the Data Regulation has a choice of law provision in Article 3(3),
which allows the Regulation to apply when international public law would
apply for a Member State.
206. Movius & Krup, supra note 6, at 179.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 198.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 
536 (S.D.N.Y., 2005)(imposing significant penalties on a party for failing to 
produce discovery documents). Some countries, like France, have imposed
criminal penalties for the violation of privacy protection as opposed the
United States where criminal penalties generally will not occur in civil
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the preservation of data especially when expecting and in the 
course of litigation.212 However, under most Member States’ data 
protection law as a result of the Privacy Directive, the data must 
be destroyed after the purpose of collection and processing has
been completed and, therefore, not transferred or available for 
discovery.
Similar to the manifest requirement, since the September 11th
Attacks, the United States allowed the government to obtain 
more information about potential terrorists under the Patriot Act.
The Patriot Act allows the government access to necessary 
information that is within the United States’ jurisdiction by 
virtue of law or international agreement.213 While the 
government can access the information, the numbers suggest the 
access of European Citizens’ information is a considerably small 
number of the total information accessed.214 Even if a data 
subject’s personal information was accessed, the 
subpoenas/warrants are not public and the data subject would 
rarely know.215 As a result of the potential access, European 
companies advertise that the United States government would 
have access to their information without their consent, and, by 
selecting a European company, the United States government 
cases unless you defy a court order. Gareth T. Evan & Farrah Pepper, Court
Holds U.S. Discovery Rules Trump French Law and Hague Convention, 9
DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE 1, 3 (Dec. 1, 2009), avai lab le  a t
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Evans-Pepper-
CourtHoldsUSDiscoveryRules.pdf.
212. See generally Zubulake, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536; Evan & Pepper, 
supra note 211, at 2.
213. See generally Societe Natioanle Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S.
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding a U.S.
may compel production of document within the possession, custody, or
control of an entity under U.S. jurisdiction). However, the courts have
considered a list of factors to compel production, namely U.S. government
concern, which will outweigh foreign interests. See generally United States
v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
214. See Steven C. Bennett et al., Storm Clouds Gathering for Cross-
Border Discovery and Data Privacy: Cloud Computing Meets the U.S.A
Patriot Act, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 235, 245 (2012).
215. See id.
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could not access the personal information for the European 
company to gain additional business.216 However, under the 
Privacy Directive, Member States can create exceptions for data 
access for investigating criminal offenses and national security, 
including terrorism.217 Even the data subject’s information would 
not be shielded from the European Union for national security 
issues.218 Therefore, the Patriot Act actually does not violate the 
Privacy Directive, and it is similar to legislation passed by 
Member States for national security issues. While the European 
Union does have influence to enforce the Privacy Directive 
exterritorialy, the document does not provide guidance when the 
privacy legislation would apply over other countries’ laws.
C. Self-Regulation as a Virus to an International 
Standard?
While the Directive can begin an International Privacy Policy, 
the Data Regulation is a better model specifically for the United 
States.219 In the United States, state governments have already 
taken the lead to develop personal data privacy protection policy 
and, if legislated in mass, have the same potential of 
fragmentation as the European Union saw under the Privacy 
Directive. Therefore, the Data Regulation is a better example 
because it provides a centralized government the opportunity to 
provide uniform policy, regulation, and enforcement for other 
216. “[F]rom 2006-2009, 1755 ‘delayed-notice’ search warrants were
issued. Of those, 1619 (92%) were issued for drug-related investigations,
122 (about 7%) for fraud; and 15 (less than1%) for terrorism related
investigations.” Id.
217. Privacy Directive, supra note 54, art. 3(b).
218. See id. at 246-47.
219. One author believes implementation in the United States would
not see the slow process of technology development “because the area of
free data transferability would be greatly expanded” with two of the largest 
markets working together. Kevin J. O’Brien, Cloud Computing Hits Snag in
Europe, NY TIMES, (Sept. 19, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/09/20/technology/20cloud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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sovereign entities. This is especially important for an issue like 
the Internet because it can span multiple jurisdictions within the 
United States.
While the European Union’s implementation of the Data 
Regulation would provide a good model for the United States’
regulatory scheme, the United States’ current approach, self-
regulation, can make transition difficult, if not impossible.
History provides examples of industries that have gone from 
little to no regulation to complete regulation of the industry by 
the government. For example, during the Prohibition era of the 
1920s, the government proactively banned the sale of alcohol 
throughout the country. However, alcohol sales during 
Prohibition were more rampant than before the regulation 
because money could be made from bootlegging. The 
enforcement of Prohibition was generally unsuccessful because
the regulation created a black market and prevented government 
oversight of a potentially harmful industry. The United States’
approach is similar to alcohol enforcement before prohibition, a 
patchwork of law regulating the industry. The self-regulatory 
approach could be a virus to the world of privacy standards like 
the Pre-Prohibition regulation because there is too much money
to be made with personal data. Therefore, a sudden increase in 
privacy regulation would likely make transition difficult and 
create an issue for enforcement.220
A change from the United States’ privacy approach could 
look similar to the beginning of Prohibition. However, a change 
in the United States’ privacy approach will have an easier 
transition, similar to the change in regulation for the banking 
industry during the New Deal. Before the New Deal legislation, 
the banking industry was predominantly unregulated, except for 
some self-regulation. These business practices led to the Crash of 
1929, contributing to the Great Depression. As a part of the New 
220. Another key difference between creating a privacy regulation
and Prohibition is Prohibition completely banned the transaction. Whereas a
privacy regulation would place limitations how to acquire and use the
information. However, a full scale and immediate regulation would still
create an enforcement issue.
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Deal legislation, the government heavily regulated the industry, a 
complete turnaround in the regulator scheme before the crash.
However, the New Deal regulation did not completely stop the 
business practices that led to the crash immediately, as there was 
a progressive approach with targeted regulations for specific 
practices. A transition to a comprehensive privacy regulation 
would be similar to the banking regulation in the New Deal as 
the federal and state governments adopt more industry specific 
privacy protection.
As a likely effect of the Privacy Directive, the federal and 
state governments have considered legislation to create 
comprehensive privacy standards,221 with some state 
governments actually passing such legislation.222 To this date the 
federal government has considered but not passed 
comprehensive privacy protection, such as the Privacy Act of 
2005.223 In 2012, President Obama put forth the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights “that would give Americans many of the 
baseline protection that the [E.U. Data Regulation] proposes to 
reinforce.”224 However, Congress has only considered the 
legislation.
State governments have also increased privacy standards, 
specifically California, Nevada, and Massachusetts to name a 
few.225 Beginning in 2002, California enacted a breach 
221. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1332,
109th Cong. (2005).
222. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 (West 2014); see S. 227, 75th Reg. 
Sess. (Nev. 2009); see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93H, §§ 1-6 (West 2014).
223. Privacy Act of 2005, S. 116, 109th Cong. (2005). The Privacy
Act responds to the public concern of “the threat of identity theft posed by
the improper use of data.” Id.
224. Natasha Singer, Data Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y.
TIMES, (Feb. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protection-
laws-an-ocean-apart.html.
225. Vermont, Minnesota, and North Dakota have also adopted
legislation that includes principles from the Privacy Directive, while other
states have adopted provisions requiring opt-in or opt-out collection. S e e  
Tallman, supra note 104, at 760.
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notification law.226 Then in 2010, Nevada and Massachusetts 
continued the privacy protection. Nevada required encryption of 
personal information outside of the company’s system.227
However, Massachusetts has the strongest and farthest-reaching 
regulation out of the states, disregarding the industry specific 
regulation.228 Massachusetts’s regulation incorporates the 
principles and policy in the Privacy Directive and the Data 
Regulation.229 Massachusetts requires written security programs 
and a specific employee responsible for the implementation of 
the program. Violation of the Massachusetts regulation would 
place the company in violation of consumer protection laws with 
$5,000 per violation penalty plus reasonable costs for 
investigation and litigation.230 Even though Massachusetts is just 
one state, the regulation from one state can affect the rest of the 
country, considering the market effect discussed above.231
Companies that conduct business in Massachusetts will have to 
determine if the costs of compliance will outweigh the revenue 
in the market and consider adopting the strictest standard 
nationally which would provide the spillover benefits to the rest 
of the country.
As a result of the state governments’ recognition and increase 
of privacy protection, the transition away from self-regulation is 
even more possible and easier because the states have done the 
grunt work, measuring pushback and enforcement issues. In 
addition, by creating the overall structure in legislation, the 
administrative agency will be able to increase the regulation 
progressively through rulemaking and adjudication, like agencies 
226. California Data Protection Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1998.82 (West 
2014).
227. 2009 Nev. Stat. 1604.
228. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93H., §§ 1-6 (2010).
229. See Penalties For Mass. Personal Information Law Violation -
201 CMR 17.00, ALERTBOOT (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.alertboot.com/
blog/blogs/endpoint_security/archive/2009/01/21/penalties-for-mass-
personal- information-law-violation-201-cmr-17-00.aspx.
230. The regulation also gives individuals the right to bring civil
negligence suits from the mishandling of data.
231. See discussion supra sec. IV.A.
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currently regulate. However, until the federal government steps-
in to provide a minimum level of regulation, self-regulation will 
still exist in the country and throughout the world.232 Once the 
federal government does step in to regulate, the domino theory 
would likely apply, and the third countries would follow the 
United States’ privacy standards to conduct business in the 
United States. With two of the world’s largest markets 
establishing similar privacy standards, a global privacy standard 
would soon exist.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the European Union established the Privacy Directive 
in 1995, the Privacy Directive has had a profound effect on the 
world by forcing changes in legislation and business practices.
Under the Privacy Directive, the Member States passed 
legislation that adopted the principles and policies within the 
Privacy Directive by placing restrictions on data processing and 
expanding the scope of information under the Privacy Directive.
While the companies in Europe, including subsidiaries based in 
Europe, are automatically subject to the Privacy Directive 
legislation, the Privacy Directive also required third countries to 
ensure adequate protection, which typically required the third 
country to adopt the same or similar legislation as the Member 
States.
However, the Privacy Directive has not completely removed 
competing approaches to privacy protection, namely the self-
regulatory approach that is prominent in the United States. Due 
to the scale of trade between the United States and European 
Union, the United States Department of Commerce and the 
European Union worked out and approved the Safe Harbor 
Agreement. The companies that self-certify under the Safe 
Harbor Agreement are eligible to process data in or from the 
232. The federal government’s involvement could mean preemption
to the state government in providing higher standards. S e e  Gellman, supra
note 3, at 147. However, preemption would require legislation to include
explicit preemption or imply preemption through field preemption.
1146 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
European Union by adhering to the seven principles enumerated 
in the Agreement. The seven principles must be included into the 
company’s privacy policy that can be enforced by the FTC.
Even though countries have complied with the processing 
restrictions, the Privacy Directive has created hardships and 
inconsistencies for the third country businesses. The European 
Union drafted the Data Regulation in 2010 and, after comments, 
the document will potentially be adopted in 2015. Under the 
Data Regulation, the principles and policies from the Privacy
Directive do not substantially differ between the documents. In 
fact, the Data Regulation provides more rights to the data 
subjects, such as the “Right to Be Forgotten” and notification of 
security breach, in addition to the uniformity issue from different 
levels of privacy protection among the Member States. The Data 
Regulation also provides varying methods for compliance such 
as the binding corporate rules. The binding corporate rules 
provision is similar to the Safe Harbor Agreement because the 
provision does not require entire countries to ensure adequate 
protection, but only individual companies. The provision also 
provides that the companies draft privacy policies that 
incorporate the rights, principles, and policies within the Data 
Regulation. With the Data Regulation almost duplicating the 
Privacy Directive, this provision provides for essentially 
uninterrupted processing during the transition between governing 
documents.
Finally, the Privacy Directive can be considered a step 
towards an international privacy standard because of the market 
power of the European Union. Since countries and companies 
want to be involved in the European market, they will adopt the 
necessary privacy protection to continue processing data in the 
European market. By restricting data processing, the European 
Union can restrict any online transaction within the European 
Union. The European Union essentially required third countries 
to adopt similar legislation to the Privacy Directive to enter the 
European Market. However, once the European Union adopts the 
Data Regulation, the mandatory requirement to establish 
adequate protection through adopting privacy legislation has 
lessened and will likely disappear with the adoption of the Data 
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Regulation. By lessening the mandatory legislative adoption 
requirement, privacy protection will likely be on a company-by-
company basis. However, with the market effect of the European 
Union, all businesses will potentially provide privacy protection 
to its consumers, essentially developing an international 
standard.
To develop an international privacy standard, the United 
States must shift away from its self-regulatory approach.
Potentially, United States’ companies can shift the country away 
from its approach through enforcement by the European Union.
While the European Union can establish and enforce the Privacy 
Directive, it cannot strong-arm another country’s courts to 
enforce the Privacy Directive. Even with jurisdiction, 
enforcement through the United States courts is unclear because 
of the competing government interests and contradicting laws.
However, the Data Regulation, unlike the Privacy Directive, 
includes a conflict of laws provision to apply the Data 
Regulation in other countries when public international law 
would apply.
History has shown that the United States can implement a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme in an industry that had little to 
no regulation without much pushback from the industry. In fact, 
the Data Regulation provides the framework for the United 
States due to the sovereign relationship between the federal 
government and state governments. While the federal 
government has only considered changes to the privacy 
protection scheme under Presidents Bush and Obama, the state 
governments have implemented modification to privacy 
protection that is similar to the principles and protection 
established in the Privacy Directive that can affect businesses 
outside of the state. As state governments continue to develop 
different privacy protection standards, the costs of compliance 
with all of the different privacy standards may become too 
costly. Congress must then step in to unify the state laws for the 
national economy. As the United States develops privacy 
standards similar to the European Union, the global market will 
shift to the standards established by two of the largest markets in 
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the world, in essence creating a global privacy standard for data 
processing.
